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Dwight D. Eisenhower was elected President in 1952, and left behind his newly formed 
NATO High Command for the White House. The NATO alliance would continue to expand 
under Eisenhower’s political protection, becoming one of his greatest legacies. The successes of 
NATO led to its application outside the European theater of the Cold War. In 1954, agreements 
were forged to create the Southeast Asian Treaty Organization, an Asian version of NATO. This 
alliance would form the bedrock defense of free Asian countries. Yet the SEATO alliance 
suffered an early death, being disbanded in 1977 as members abandoned the organization and 
U.S. Vietnam policy imploded. The SEATO alliance was doomed to failure, being a First World 
solution for a Third World problem. NATO was designed to tie together the interests of the old 
capitalist democracies of Western Europe. It was designed to fight and win the next great war. 
SEATO was intended to ally the different former colonies of Southeast Asia into one cohesive 
bloc. Its major objective was to root out Communist insurgencies. It was this failure to 
distinguish the needs of Southeast Asia from the needs of Europe that would destroy SEATO and 
drag the United States almost alone into the morass of Vietnam. 
On June 1, 1952, General Dwight D. Eisenhower formally submitted his resignation as 
Supreme NATO Commander to President Harry Truman. In his letter, he defended his decision 
to leave NATO, stating “the special organizational and initial planning missions that were 
deemed critical in the late weeks of 1950 have now been accomplished.”1 Eisenhower had 
reframed the Western alliance of World War Two into a defensive alliance opposed to Soviet 
expansion. He had navigated the treacherous political waters of Europe and created a force for 
                                                          
1 Dwight D. Eisenhower, The Papers of Dwight David Eisenhower, Alfred DuPont Chandler et al., eds., (Baltimore: 
John Hopkins Press, 2003) http://eisenhower.press.jhu.edu. 
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freedom in the West. The political skills honed in the crucible of total war served him well and 
during his presidency the alliance blossomed into the crown jewel of the Cold War.2 
NATO, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, was born not long after the fall of the 
Third Reich, but its roots go much deeper. NATO was the culmination of substantial military 
theory in the wake of World War One. This particular school of thought, expounded by the likes 
of Fox Conner and George Marshall, emphasized the vulnerability of democratic countries 
against a totalitarian foe.3 The belligerent and expansionist Nazi Germany demonstrated the 
perils of democracies acting independently. Countries like Denmark, Poland, and 
Czechoslovakia were conquered by the Nazis through outright war and political maneuvering. In 
order to counter the unity of dictatorships, democracies needed to band together and shoulder the 
burden of war amongst themselves. Only a grand alliance of democracies could protect free 
people around the world.4 
Eisenhower had been a student of this school since the 1910’s. He and George Patton had 
pioneered new tank warfare strategies while at Fort Meade and in Gettysburg. Their strategies 
called for a massing of armored might to punch through enemy lines and reach deep into the rear 
of enemy formations. Though his ideas were not popular at the time, Eisenhower continued to 
expand upon these ideas and theories through study and practice. During his time serving in the 
Panama Canal Zone, Eisenhower received what he called “a graduate course in military theory” 
at the hands of Fox Conner.5 Versed in Clausewitz and the practices of modern tank warfare, 
Eisenhower became a leading student of this modern military theory. After his time in Panama, 
                                                          
2 Mark Perry, Partners in Command: George Marshall and Dwight Eisenhower in War and Peace, Reprint ed. (New 
York: Penguin Books, 2008), 310. 
3 Ibid., 44-46. 
4 Dwight D. Eisenhower, At Ease: Stories I Tell My Friends (Garden City: Doubleday, 1967), 226. 
5 Perry, Partners in Command, 45. 
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Eisenhower was assigned as an aide to General Douglas MacArthur in the Philippines while the 
general served as a military advisor to the American protectorate’s government. There, 
Eisenhower learned how to assuage the egos of great men, MacArthur’s in this case.6 It was a 
trial by fire. Whether it was the dispute over receiving Filipino military accolades or the 
allocating of blame for an unpopular military parade, Ike learned to handle himself.7 Despite 
their sometimes explosive disputes, Eisenhower and MacArthur respected each other as officers 
and Eisenhower grew as an administrator. Eisenhower’s long and arduous education would make 
him an ideal officer in the international conflict to come. 
After his promotion to the staff of General George Marshall, Eisenhower was given the 
opportunity to demonstrate what he had learned. Eisenhower was tasked with organizing the 
Allied war effort in the European theater, where America’s allies were deeply divided over 
matters of strategy and leadership. Eisenhower’s work balancing the needs of many dissonant 
voices would prove critical to future European alliances. He handled the politics of his troops, 
moving anti-British American officers to the rear, and reigning in the excesses of anti-American 
sentiment amongst the British officer corps.8 He fought to keep the rivalries of men like General 
Patton and Field Marshall Bernard Montgomery in check. He parried the political needs of the 
democratic leaders of the Allies to advance the essential war effort. Allied efforts to improve 
coordination between the different national military branches yielded mostly excellent results on 
the battlefield. Daring commanders were promoted as they practiced the ideas of combat 
Eisenhower espoused, while hesitant and overly cautious officers were cashiered, such as Lloyd 
                                                          
6 Dwight D. Eisenhower, At Ease, 223-226. 
7 John Eisenhower, General Ike: a Personal Reminiscence (New York: Free Press, 2003), 28-30. 
8 Perry, Partners in Command, 167-184. 
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Fredendall.9 Eisenhower turned the alliance into a well-oiled war machine. It would be this 
massive machine that would lead to victory on the beaches of Normandy and meet up with the 
Soviet army in the ashes of Germany.10 
As the wartime alliance with the Soviets began to fray in the aftermath of World War II, 
talks began about a new post-war alliance. Stalin was not cooperating with the Western allies, 
gradually installing Communist regimes in all Soviet-liberated territory. Soviet policy became 
more intractable in relation to the West. The fear of a new totalitarian, expansionist ideology 
taking root in Europe led Western leaders to prepare for conflict using the lessons of World War 
II. A grand alliance of free democratic nations was needed for the defense of all free peoples. So 
began the creation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.11 
NATO was a massive undertaking, in spite of the groundwork laid by World War II. 
Many of the parties involved wished to end their alliance at the war’s end. NATO was threatened 
by war-weary Britons, recalcitrant Frenchmen, occupied Germans, and isolationist Americans. 
Great Britain, having borne the costs of the war for the longest period, was in a poor position to 
contribute to a grand alliance’s army. Its economy was in shambles, its manpower reserves were 
depleted, and its empire was coming down around its ears.12 France was suffering not only the 
effects of German occupation but a more violent collapse of its imperial power.13 Germany was 
demilitarized and divided, having endured de-Nazification and its division into East and West 
Germany.14 And the era of Democratic rule was under assault in the United States, and with it 
                                                          
9 Perry, Partners in Command, 171-173. 
10 Carlo D'Este, Eisenhower: a Soldier's Life (New York: Henry Holt & Company, 2003), 695. 
11 Perry, Partners in Command, 379. 
12 Eisenhower, The Papers of Dwight David Eisenhower.  http://eisenhower.press.jhu.edu. 
13 Ibid. 
14 Ibid. 
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the robust foreign policy of Roosevelt and Truman. The Republicans, riding public sentiment, 
were threatening to return to the isolationist policies of the interwar period.15 
There were other areas of dispute. Certain members, such as Britain and France had a 
history of competing imperial claims. Other nations harbored ill-feelings toward their fellow 
alliance members. France was especially leery of allowing West Germany to rearm as a NATO 
member.16 However, the disputes could stretch back further than the 20th century. Directly before 
leaving for the Republican National Convention, Eisenhower had to settle a dispute about Danish 
troops defending historically contested German territory between Denmark and Germany.17 War 
reparations and reconstruction also muddied the waters of the alliance. Money was needed to 
rebuild Europe and restart its ravaged economy. Several prominent members of the alliance had 
an uphill battle winning the votes for the treaty ratification, overcoming major peace lobbies that 
believed the alliance would start the next war. 
NATO had no small share of challenges in its formative days. Nevertheless, Eisenhower 
managed to pull the alliance together. He assuaged the fears of the French about German 
rearmament. He lobbied the American Congress for the money to rebuild and rearm Europe. 
Eisenhower, employing his prestige as the great liberator of Europe, pulled together the disparate 
political factions of Europe to ratify the treaty. The longstanding cooperation amongst the 
majority of the European members helped ease them in the alliance more easily. In 1949, the 
treaty was ratified, and the school of Atlanticism was born.18 
                                                          
15 Ibid. 
16 Ibid. 
17 Ibid. 
18 John Lewis Gaddis, The Long Peace: Inquiries Into the History of the Cold War. (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 1987), 157. 
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NATO embodied the war-time alliance in many ways. It established a united military 
command, which was critical to making the alliance effective. The war-time experiences made 
such a loss of sovereignty more tolerable to the European governments. They had come to 
appreciate the benefits of a united command. Eisenhower’s continuing service in that role also 
eased the discomfort some Europeans had. This gave NATO the flexibility and resources needed 
to counter Soviet forces beyond the Iron Curtain. NATO was clear in its purpose: all members 
were obligated to protect all other members from any aggression.19 This well-defined stance 
gave NATO a firm foundation around which to build its policies. Any aggression called all 
members to defend the alliance, with a well-organized core of troops under the NATO High 
Command. 
The United States expected member nations to play their part in funding the alliance. The 
idea was that the United States would protect and shelter Western Europe with its standing army 
and nuclear umbrella until Europe could handle its own defense once more.20 The economic 
recovery of post-war Europe was critical to the alliance. The Marshall Plan helped Europe mend 
the damage of the war and jump-start the economic engine of the west. Germany was allowed to 
retain its heavy industrial capacities. British and French industries rebounded in the wake of 
World War II, creating new markets for American goods and providing the industrial base for 
their modern militaries.21 Prosperity strengthened the alliance politically, as the benefits of free 
markets prevented Communist parties from feeding on the social discontent and weakening the 
                                                          
19 NATO Treaty; April 4, 1949, American Foreign Policy,  1950-1955, Basic Docs, vol 1, Department of State 
Publication 6446 General Foreign Policy Series 117 Washington, DC : Government Printing Office, 1957 in  “The 
Avalon Project,” Yale Law School, accessed May 1, 2015, http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/nato.asp. 
20 Dwight D. Eisenhower, The Papers of Dwight David Eisenhower. http://eisenhower.press.jhu.edu. 
21 C. Maxwell Stanley, Waging Peace (New York: Macmillan Company, 1959), 112-120. 
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resolve of alliance members. With Europe’s economy on the rebound, the prospects of the new 
NATO alliance looked promising, and Europe’s future looked bright. 
In 1954, Eisenhower had another opportunity to create an alliance as a bulwark against 
Communism, this time in Asia. The Asian continent was rife with Communist insurgency. 
Asians had suffered similar devastation during World War Two, and had suffered a similar 
explosion of Communist regimes in the wake of the war. So in Manila, 1954, America and her 
Asian allies founded SEATO, the Southeast Asian Treaty Organization. The NATO model was 
being applied to the hot spot of Asia.  
It was this conflation of the needs of Southeast Asia with the needs of Europe that would 
give birth to SEATO, the Southeast Asian Treaty Organization. And it would be this same 
conflation of needs that would be the death of SEATO twenty-two years later. The alliance 
required an industrialized economic base, a people invested in their existing economic system, 
and a Cold War “us versus them” mentality. Southeast Asia lacked in all of these aspects, but 
America’s efforts continued along these lines nevertheless. This well-meaning mistake would 
cost the United States dearly over the next generation. 
Compared with the founding of NATO, the founding of SEATO appeared to be much 
more precipitous. NATO had already been established as the bulwark against Communist 
expansion in Europe since 1951, proving the effectiveness of such an alliance. The isolationist 
wing of the Republican Party had been reined in by Eisenhower’s election and by the death of its 
greatest national proponent, Robert Taft.22 A new, more aggressive and robust foreign policy 
was in place thanks to President Eisenhower and his Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles. 
                                                          
22 Ambrose Videos. Eisenhower's Secret War, Part 1, The Lure of the Presidency, 2013. 
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Eisenhower himself was a shrewd Cold Warrior, carrying the prestige of his past service with 
him to his foreign policy. The American public believed in Eisenhower, allowing him an 
essentially free hand in foreign policy. Moreover, several of America’s strongest allies, Britain 
and France, were heavily invested in Southeast Asia remaining free of Communism. With so 
many forces arrayed in favor of an alliance, it seemed that the NATO model would be 
successfully transplanted to Southeast Asia. NATO style alliances would become the default tool 
of American military foreign policy. 
But the conditions on the ground in Asia were vastly different than those of Europe in the 
early days of NATO. SEATO was born at a time of great conflict, with Asia becoming the new 
hotspot of the Cold War. During World War II, Japan had run roughshod over the majority of the 
Far East. Their occupation and exploitation of vast swaths of Asia fueled resistance movements, 
many employing guerilla tactics and Communist rhetoric. These groups would continue to 
plague most of Southeast Asia throughout the 1950’s and 1960’s.  
Some of these groups’ initial successes were staggering to the American cause. In 1949, 
the Chinese Nationalists of Chiang Kai-Shek were defeated in their long running civil war with 
the Chinese Communists of Mao Zedong. China, with its massive population, had fallen into the 
Communist orbit, doubling the size of the Communist bloc. The Eisenhower administration had 
inherited the Korean War from President Truman. North Korea, sanctioned by the USSR and 
supported by Chinese “volunteer” troops, had attempted to annex the entire Korean peninsula.23 
Thousands of Americans had died trying to drive back North Korean troops and their Chinese 
allies. Chinese troops intermittently bombarded upon the outpost islands of Quemoy and Matsu 
                                                          
23 Evan Thomas, Ike's Bluff: President Eisenhower's Secret Battle to Save the World, Reprint ed. (New York: Back Bay 
Books, 2013), 34, 67. 
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protecting Taiwan, in an attempt to bully the Taiwanese and test the United States’ commitment 
to the Nationalist cause.24 The French were being broken down by the ongoing Communist 
insurgency in their Indochina colony, an insurgency that would later plague the new American 
client state of South Vietnam. Communist insurgencies were also appearing in all across 
Southeast Asia, threatening to continue the indomitable march of Communism in the Far East. It 
seemed the nations of Asia were primed to fall to Communism, as per the Domino Theory.25 
Nations had already begun to fall, and a chain reaction seemed inevitable. Surely if NATO could 
protect Western Europe from Communist aggression, a similar institution could be used to shore 
up the defenses of the free lands of Asia. 
The State Department had been studiously working to establish alliances with the nations 
of Southeast Asia, but the fall of Diem Bien Phu in 1954 forced their hand. War and strife had 
been raging across French Indochina since the invasion of the Japanese in 1942. The Japanese 
invasion, and subsequent withdrawal, left a power vacuum in the French colony. Native 
resistance, which had been forged under Japanese occupation, surged up and sought 
independence for Vietnam. France was hard-pressed to maintain its empire in the wake of Nazi 
occupation. The Nazi invaders had sapped France economically and had undermined the 
legitimacy of colonial hegemony with its racial expansionism. The empire was threatened on 
several fronts, with Algeria roiling with independence sentiments and French Sub-Sahara Africa 
yearning to join the other newly independent nations. France would have been justified in 
                                                          
24 Rosemary Foot, "The Eisenhower administration's fear of empowering the Chinese." Political Science Quarterly 
(Academy Of Political Science) 111, no. 3 (Fall96 1996): 505. 
25 Dwight D. Eisenhower, Mandate for Change, 1953-1956: the White House Years (New York: Doubleday, 1963), 
333. 
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leaving Indochina in charge of its own future and instead tend to affairs closer to home, like 
Algeria.26 
Yet France remained committed to restoring its hegemony to Indochina, as it did 
throughout its colonial empire. That commitment led to a bloody guerilla war, with heavy 
colonialist overtones. The native elites who had allied with the French against the Communists 
were branded as imperialist stooges, undermining the local alternatives to Communist rule. 
France’s behavior did not help the United States’ case that it was not a “neo-colonialist” and that 
SEATO was truly about protecting against “Communist imperialism.” The war would slowly 
drag France down, until its climatic defeat at Diem Bien Phu.27 
 In the months before the fall of Diem Bien Phu, when defeat seemed to hang in the air, 
Secretary of State Dulles began working on an American response to the Indochina debacle. 
Many different ideas were considered, including direct American intervention, but Eisenhower 
would not directly intervene without massive allied support. Eisenhower’s New Look policy 
required avoiding bush wars since he wanted to reduce military expenditures by reducing the 
regular army. Only the regular American army would be able to save the French army from 
disaster.28 
With the military solution essentially off the table, Dulles starting organizing the 
framework of what would become the SEATO alliance.29 The fall of Diem Bien Phu and the 
start of the Geneva Conference increased the pressure on Dulles for a coherent American 
                                                          
26 Tyler Stovall, France Since the Second World War: Seminar Studies in History (Harlow, England: New York: 
Longman, 2001), 49-55. 
27 David L. Anderson, Trapped by Success: the Eisenhower Administration and Vietnam, 1953-1961, (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1991), 26-29. 
28 Stanley, Waging Peace, 90-95. 
29 John Foster Dulles Oral History Collection. Wilmington, Del.: Scholarly Resources, 1984. Microflim, Lord Casey 
Transcript. 
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response to the crisis. In addition, the Geneva Accords limited the influence of SEATO by 
forbidding the Associated States, the states formed from French Indochina, to join in any military 
alliances.30 France was humiliated by the terms of the Geneva Accords, being compelled to grant 
Indochina independence under Communist terms.31 The painful diplomatic loss of the Geneva 
Accords needed to be counteracted, in order to reassert the authority France had lost in the 
region. 
The French defeat needed to be addressed quickly before the dreaded Domino Theory 
could come to pass.32 If untreated, the administration feared that neighboring countries could be 
made more vulnerable to infiltration, and Southeast Asia could fall into the Communist camp 
completely. Secretary of State John Foster Dulles was employed to round up the international 
support for the alliance.33 Dulles preached the virtues of the defensive pact system, warning 
potential allies of the dangers of continuing Communist subversion.34 Dulles was somewhat of a 
zealot when it came to defensive pacts, unlike Eisenhower who was very reserved in his 
pronouncements on such matters.35 SEATO was Dulles’ project, with Eisenhower reserving his 
judgments to the situation in Indichina. A conference was held in Manila, hosted by America’s 
close partner the Philippines. After a few weeks of bitter wrangling and drafting, Dulles had his 
response to the disappointing Geneva Accords. Two months after Eisenhower declared that the 
                                                          
30 Anderson, Trapped by Success, 72. 
31 That is to say, terms more friendly to the Communist cause than what France was comfortable with. South 
Vietnam remained ostensibly  non-communist and free. 
32 Eisenhower, Mandate for Change, 1953-1956, 333. 
33 John Foster Dulles Oral History Collection. Wilmington, Del.: Scholarly Resources, 1984. Microflim, Doctor 
Khomen. 
34 Ibid. 
35 Townsend Hoopes, The Devil and John Foster Dulles (Toronto: Little, Brown, 1973), 242. 
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United States was not bound by the Geneva Accords, the Southeast Asian Treaty Organization 
was born under the Manila Pact.36 
The alliance bound together the nations of Australia, New Zealand, France, the United 
Kingdom, the United States, Pakistan, Thailand, and the Philippines against aggression by the 
Soviet-Chinese Communists. SEATO consisted of several “non-native” members, namely the 
United Kingdom, France, and the United States. Britain and France were the biggest and 
strongest of the former colonial overlords of Southeast Asia. Burma, Ceylon, Vietnam, Laos, 
Cambodia, Singapore, Malaysia, India, and Pakistan had all been colonies of Britain and France 
before World War Two. None of these nations signed on to SEATO, in spite of their concerns 
over Chinese Communism and Communist insurgency. Distinctly missing from the alliance were 
many of these “native” countries, countries whose people and culture were native to Asia. In 
fact, only Pakistan, Thailand, and the Philippines were “native” members of the alliance.37  
This roster included some of the anomalies of Asia. The Philippines were a former 
American colony with close ties to its former imperial master. Colonialism had not spoiled the 
relationship between the two nations as it had across most of the Third World.38 The liberation of 
the Philippines in World War Two helped bring the two nations closer together. This relationship 
proved crucial in giving the United States a pliable Third World ally in Asia.39 
                                                          
36 Eisenhower, Mandate for Change, 1953-1956, 374. 
37 It should be noted that while Australia and New Zealand were subjects of the British Empire and are technically 
native to Southeast Asia, they do not share the same characteristics and experiences as their neighbors. They are, 
for the sake of this paper, considered transplant European nations, more akin to the United States than to 
Indonesia. 
38 Though I am not trying to downplay the exploitative and colonialist policies of the United States toward the 
Philippines, the two nations had a much healthier and more congenial relationship than most former colonies, 
which helps explain why the Philippines was willing to sign on to this American policy and support many of its 
Southeast Asian initiatives. This relationship existed on a government to government level at the very least. 
39 Yung-Hwan Jo, US Foreign Policy in Asia: An Appraisal of America’s Role in Asia (Oxford: ABC-Clio, Inc. 1978), 
390-391. 
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Thailand was one of the few Southeast Asian nations to maintain its independence during 
the late Age of Imperialism. Its struggles revolved less around de-colonization and more around 
how to re-stabilize in the wake of Japan’s defeat in World War Two. Thailand’s government had 
been a willing supporter of Japan in the war. The nation had been torn apart by this policy, with 
competing nationalist movements fighting for control of Thailand against the Japanese allied 
government. This collaboration damaged Thailand’s credibility abroad, with its Asian neighbors 
looking negatively upon their association with the Japanese. It was plagued by the rise of 
Communist insurgents in Southeast Asia, the result of the Japanese occupation.40 Thailand 
needed aid, and only the United States was willing and able to step in. 
Pakistan was a nation created explicitly by decolonization. It had been violently cleaved 
from British India and had a poor sense of national identity.41 Pakistan was highly leery of India, 
its larger “brother.” Its borders were intricately entwined with India, making it vulnerable to 
Indian land claims. Pakistan was desperate enough for United States support that it signed on to 
the alliance. These three SEATO allies were hardly the best Asia had to offer. 
The nations that the United States sought to include in the SEATO alliance were nations 
with very little experience cooperating with each other. Many of them had been fellow colonies, 
and had been played against one another to maintain colonial lordship. Foreign police forces 
were not uncommon in places like Burma.42 The only unifying real unifying factor in the history 
of these countries was their resistance to Japanese occupation in World War Two. Prior to that, 
few of these nations had ever sought to work together. This lack of cooperation made forging an 
                                                          
40 Les Buszynski “Thailand and the Manila Pact,” The World Today Vol. 36, No. 2 (Feb., 1980), 45-51. Accessed April 
8, 2015. http://www.jstor.org/stable/40395167 
41 Ian Talbot, Pakistan: A New History (New York: Columbia University Press, 2012), 58-61. 
42 Mary P. Callahan, Making Enemies: War and State Building in Burma (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2005), 145. 
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alliance all the more difficult, especially for nations that had just regained control of their foreign 
policy. 
The membership in SEATO weakened its own power. Without the commitments of 
larger nations like India and Indonesia, the alliance was too weak to defend itself. Part of the 
value of the NATO alliance in Europe was that the defense needs of the alliance would be 
distributed amongst the member nations, reducing the burden any one nation would have to bear. 
Though the United States was the main power behind the alliance, the European allies 
supplemented all American efforts. With SEATO, however, there was very little the native allies 
could provide. This was one critical difference between NATO and SEATO. NATO and SEATO 
would both depend heavily upon the United States for the bulk of their military resources. But 
NATO had the benefit of including rich industrial capitalist countries that could maintain their 
own standalone, state-of-the-art military forces. Even though the United States bore the majority 
of the defense burden in NATO, the inclusion of such rich and ostensibly powerful countries 
provided a psychological boost to the alliance. The traditional great powers of Britain, France, 
and Germany added their prestige to the alliance and reinforced the idea of its power, even if 
their contributions were on the decline. 
SEATO had only two members, Australia and New Zealand, which could arguably be 
rich and industrialized enough to maintain such a force. The remaining members were either 
committed elsewhere in the world or not nearly industrialized enough to maintain the modern 
military needed to repel overt Communist aggression. And their numbers were too small. There 
were three native allies, with only two of them sharing a landmass with the major Communist 
forces. They could not compensate for their poor industrialization with manpower numbers, as 
China had done during the Korean War. 
15 
 
The European allies were of little use in Asia. The United Kingdom and France had to 
provide military support for both the NATO and SEATO alliance, alongside other commitments 
amongst their former colonial possessions. Given the weakness both countries were struggling 
with, this proved impossible. France was exempted several times from its NATO requirements in 
order for the nation’s troops and material to be redirected to the insurgency in Vietnam.43 The 
United Kingdom was painfully hesitant to commit its limited troops to defending Southeast Asia 
when Europe’s own borders seemed so threatened. Britain under the diplomatic guidance of 
Foreign Minister Antony Eden would become a thorn in the Americans’ side when it came to 
conflicts in Southeast Asia.44 President Eisenhower would not act militarily in Southeast Asian 
hotspots like Diem Bien Phu in Vietnam without British support.45 And British support would 
not be forthcoming in the wake of Britain own de-colonization debacles. 
Finally, the ANZUS treaty, which militarily tied together the United States, Australia, 
and New Zealand, fulfilled many of the same goals that SEATO was designed for. Ratified in 
1951, the ANZUS treaty was a tripartite defense pact uniting these three Anglo-Saxon transplant 
countries in their common defense.46 Australia and New Zealand would be protected by their 
contract with the United States. This reduced the commitment to SEATO to redundancy. 
Australia and New Zealand were simply along for the ride with the Americans. They were 
already part of the American-led bloc, and now they had been used to supplement the pitiful roll-
call of SEATO. 
                                                          
43 Anderson, Trapped by Success, 23-25. 
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45 Anderson, Trapped by Success, 20-23. 
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The treaty itself contained weaknesses that would surface throughout the alliance’s 
lifetime. The alliance charter lacked an article explicitly outlines the consequences of aggression 
against a member. There was no Article 5, calling for unilateral action against outside 
aggression.47 The SEATO treaty called for each nation to view attacks upon its fellow members 
as “endanger[ing] its own peace and safety, and agrees that it will in that event act to meet the 
common danger.”48 How each nation shall meet the common danger is not explicitly stated, 
though in it assumed war would be the expected response.49 In addition, there was no centralized 
command center of the alliance, as there had been in Europe’s NATO alliance.50 With no central 
command structure and a weak collective defense clause, SEATO was a poor imitation of the 
robust NATO alliance. 
On top of all these serious challenges, the decolonization of the Third World was 
underway. British India had violently divided into Muslim Pakistan and Hindu India. The 
Mandates of the Middle East had been revealed as shams during the interwar period. Israel had 
declared independence after a long running guerilla conflict and descended into conflict with its 
Arab and Palestinian neighbors. Once-dependable sources of raw materials like oil and rubber 
were becoming less compliant to the needs of Europe and the West. Nationalist leaders were 
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rising throughout the Middle East, shaking the political field immeasurably as they tested their 
newfound power.51 
The nations of Southeast Asia harbored their own suspicions about the United States. 
This was due to several factors. The United States was on generally good terms with most of the 
former imperial powers. United States had its own history of racism and, to a lesser degree, 
imperialism. The United States was a proponent of capitalism, a concept that was negatively 
associated with a number of exploitative colonial policies. Finally, The United States had its own 
vested interests in Southeast Asia that had little to do with the decolonization of the region. 
Sometimes, American policy conflicted with local political needs, to the detriment of American 
foreign policy. Many of the potential members of SEATO had at least one of these factors 
contributing to their refusal to join. 
Burma, like Thailand, was threatened by Communist rebels supported by the Chinese. 
But it was also fractured in the wake of Japanese occupation and the return of British power. 
There were many militant groups ravaging post-colonial Burma, with the Communists being 
only one of many threats. This dangerously destabilized situation made Burma vulnerable to 
subversion at the hands of the Chinese through the rebellious Communists. However, this fear of 
the Chinese actually drove the Burmese to reject SEATO as a defensive option rather than to 
embrace American protection. The Americans, under a policy instituted by Truman and 
continued by Eisenhower, were supplying and supporting Chinese Nationalist troops who had 
fled to Burma at the end of the Chinese Civil War.52 These Nationalists were waging low level 
attacks of sabotage against the Chinese and open conflict with competing militant groups. 
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Fearing that the Chinese, antagonized by these remnants of the Nationalist army, would launch 
an invasion, Burma petitioned the American government to stop supporting them, which it 
refused to do. American foreign policy could not abandon the Nationalist cause. The China-First 
lobby in Congress would not tolerate any decline in U.S. support for Chiang Kai-shek and the 
“Chi-Nats,” no matter how useless they were.53 Incensed, Burma became a vocal opponent of 
SEATO from its founding, and spoke passionately against the United States at the Bandung 
Conference a year later. 
American anti-communist policy in Southeast Asia led the United States to support 
Chinese Nationalists in Burma. This blatant violation of Burmese sovereignty cost the United 
States a prime ally in the Third World. The Burmese were afraid of a Communist insurgency and 
takeover. They, like Thailand, could have become part of the Third World contingent of SEATO. 
But the United States, unable to recognize the validity of Burmese complaints, drove the 
Burmese into the Non-Alignment camp. The United States failed to balance the needs of a newly 
independent Third World country with the needs of the Cold War. Cold War policy overrode 
decolonization policy, at the cost of a Third World ally.54 
Jawaharlal Nehru, Prime Minister of India, was perhaps the most powerful Non-Aligned 
player in Southeast Asia. Leading the largest new nation in the world, Nehru could have been a 
powerful ally in the Cold War, serving to counterbalance China’s hegemony in the region. India 
could have provided the manpower to match China’s ample reserves and served as the face of 
US-Asian foreign relations. Though Nehru’s socialism did predispose him in some ways to the 
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Soviet-Sino bloc, India was not an active member of either Cold War bloc.55 He was the leader 
of the Neutralist/Non-Alignment Movement amongst Third World nations. 
Nehru’s theory of Non-Alignment stemmed from a desire for stability. Nehru wanted 
himself, and by extension India, to be a force for peace through stability.56 Therefore, any 
aggressive actions that would upset the balance of power between the Soviets and the Americans 
were to be avoided and condemned. If any one side grew too powerful and upset the status quo, 
nuclear war could break out. At the same time, Third World nations had their own needs outside 
of the Cold War, and would always be better served by avoiding entangling alliances with the 
world superpowers. Non-alignment meant creating a safe space for the development of Third 
World national identities and economies. 
This made Nehru the odd man out politically. It would lead him to criticize the West 
during the Hungarian Crisis of 1956 for supporting the independence movement rather than the 
Soviets for suppressing the independence movement.57 By his logic, the Soviets were 
maintaining the balance of power by keeping Hungary behind the Iron Curtain, while the U.S. 
was upsetting the balance of by trying to separate Hungary from the Soviet sphere. Nevertheless, 
Nehru would remain critical of both blocs throughout his life and continued to call upon Third 
World nations to embrace the neutralist massage and to reject the Cold War dichotomy. 
This philosophy made the American actions in Southeast Asia unacceptable. By forging 
an alliance in Southeast Asia, the United States was threatening to upset the balance of power in 
Asia. Various Southeast Asian nations wanted to be excluded from the ever-growing Cold War. 
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Otherwise, the nations involved would become simple puppets, proxies for the superpowers’ 
games. Their independence would be rendered meaningless, and their people would suffer as 
they had under colonialism, with their needs subordinated to American foreign policy needs.  
China would likewise be alienated by such an action, as SEATO would clearly be 
intended to encircle China much in the same way that the Soviet Union was encircled by NATO. 
Nehru feared that this would push China be to more belligerent and more pro-Soviet. He 
considered China as part of the de-colonized, un-industrialized Third World, despite it clear 
Communist ideology.58 Nehru’s view contradicted the Western view of a massive, cohesive 
Sino-Soviet bloc. China was its own master in Nehru’s view, and needed to be respected if there 
was to be peace in Asia. If not, then China would come to represent a serious threat to Indian and 
Southeast Asian security. 
In addition, a US-centered alliance would take away from the importance of Asia and 
Africa. To Nehru, Asian and African nations should not be second-rate member of an American 
dominated alliance, as they had been second-rate members of the old European empires. The US 
was the natural leader of its own alliance, and Nehru believed that the time for Asia to lead itself 
had arrived, rather than have another “white” country lead the “benighted” people of Asia. 
Particularly, his status as leader and promoter of Asian and African interests prevented him from 
becoming a figurehead of the American effort. Though it seems unlikely that Nehru would have 
ever signed on to an American anti-communist effort, by creating SEATO, the United States 
pushed India further into the neutralist camp. If the United States had been more subtle, and had 
allowed China or the Soviet Union to aggravate Nehru, he might have become more receptive to 
American goals. 
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Indonesia, under the leadership of Sukarno, was another major player in Southeast Asia. 
The United States had an uncomfortable relationship with Sukarno. Like most nationalist leaders 
at the time, Sukarno tried to play the Cold War superpowers against each other.59 Several times 
during the Eisenhower administration Indonesia was asked to affirm its support for the free 
world, and every time to returned to its Neutralist stance.60 Sukarno also desired to supplant 
Nehru as the spokesman of the Third World. The Bandung Conference would prove to be his 
opportunity. Indonesia would become the site of the Bandung Conference. Nationalist leaders 
from all over the Third World representative of the non-white nations travelled to Indonesia to 
promote their interests and defy the Cold War superpowers. It was the high point of Sukarno’s 
career. His rule would slowly be eroded by external pressures from the CIA and the internal 
pressures of Indonesian politics due to his own excesses.61 
Southeast Asia had its own crop of native born power-brokers in the 1950’s. These 
leaders and the people they represented were mainly concerned with creating the countries they 
had just freed. They desired to make their own way in the world, free of the external control and 
domination they had known for so long. They also wanted to be respected as nations, which 
required wealth and national prestige. Industrialization and de-colonization were at the heart of 
these emerging national programs.62 
Years of racism and paternalism had driven a wedge between these countries and their 
first-world counterparts. The British and the French had almost no credibility amongst these 
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nations. This distrust was extended to many of the ideas they espoused. Industrialization under 
the colonial regimes had been aimed at the extraction of wealth for the home country. The 
parallel processes of de-colonization and Cold War escalation would prove problematic for all 
involved. These processes resulted in serious conflicts in the region, such as the French 
Indochina insurgency attempting to expunge the sobriquet “French.”  
This conflict in Vietnam illustrates one of the fatal flaws in the American approach to 
defense: Eisenhower’s military theory. Eisenhower envisioned NATO as an extension of the 
Western alliance of World War II, which it was. This vision was of industrial democratic nations 
joining together in a common defense against a more organized and monolithic foe. NATO tanks 
and troops would fight pitched battles over the German plains, with armor leading the way. This 
was why the regular army was maintained in Europe. It was the threat of this powerful image of 
combat, combined with the massive American nuclear arsenal, which was meant to deter any 
Soviet aggression. 
This model could not be applied to the Third World, especially Vietnam. The nations 
involved could not produce the militaries envisioned by NATO and subsequently SEATO 
strategists. Moreover, these Third World nations were not fighting pitched battles over industrial 
bases and resources. Guerilla warfare was the calling card of Third World Communists. Battles 
were waged over the loyalty of villages, not centers of production. Many of the Communist 
guerillas dispersed their forces, making pitched combat impossible. The terrain worked against 
such plans as well, with jungles and wetlands making traditional military maneuvers virtually 
worthless. The war against such a foe would stagnate, which violated one of the cardinal rules of 
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Eisenhower’s conflict theory.63 Vietnam was not a set-piece battlefield, which is what SEATO 
was designed to fight.64 Instead, the Vietnamese Communists employed a type of infiltration that 
could not be easily met with overwhelming military might. 
The founding of SEATO did not have the intended effect amongst the countries of 
Southeast Asia. In fact, far from encouraging countries to join the alliance against Communism, 
the nations of Southeast Asia sought to assert their own power. Asian nations had just regained 
their independence, and many wanted to make their new political power felt. They did not want 
to be pulled between the Soviet and American spheres of influence. They defied the bipolar 
system of nations that was generally accepted in the wake of World War Two. New paths were 
opening up, with the promise of sovereignty and freedom. 
The Bandung Conference was a direct response to the founding of SEATO a year earlier. 
Held in Indonesia, the Bandung conference was a meeting of the newly independent nations of 
Africa and Asia. These nations wanted to demonstrate their authority in the face of the American 
policy. This did not make them friends of the Soviet bloc, but it did undermine the alliance that 
SEATO sought to create. Men like Sukarno used this conference as an opportunity to showcase 
their nationalist credentials, standing up to the major powers, and flaunting their countries 
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freedom. Such theatrics would prove extremely popular with many of the people of the Third 
World.65 
The conference would also signal the loss of the Third World to the Non-Alignment 
Movement. The Soviet-American conflict was viewed poorly by Third world countries, who 
wished to be independent world players rather than subordinate allies in a larger conflict.  Non-
Alignment was a means of countering the Eurocentric Cold War conflict. Africans and Asians 
would no longer be pawns in the great games of northern superpowers.66 The conference was 
attended exclusively by non-white representatives, emphasizing the racial divide between the 
Third World and the Soviet-American world. 
The conference was a major headache for the United States. The conference focused on 
problems of peace, de-colonialism, and race. The United States’ creation of a new military 
alliance, its cozy relationship with many of the former colonial masters of Southeast Asia, and its 
domestic difficulties on race left it wide open to serious criticism.67 The Soviet Union was also 
criticized for its role in militarizing the world and its opposition to important cultural markers 
such as religion. With China in attendance, the United States saw the conference as a cover for 
expanding Communist influence and ideology under the guise of de-colonization. This inability 
to separate local needs from Communist ideology rendered the United States tone-deaf to 
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Southeast Asian interests.68 This tone-deafness can be attributed to Eisenhower’s service in 
World War II, and its impact on his thinking and the thinking of his peers and aides. 
Eisenhower was a culturally literate man. He had had to negotiate the finer distinction of 
European identity politics throughout his military career. He was aware of the history and culture 
that made Europeans distinct from one another. But Eisenhower’s education was almost entirely 
Eurocentric. His education had turned his focus to the next great war in Europe. Though he had 
spent time abroad, notably in Panama and the Philippines, these excursions were dominated by 
European matters. Eisenhower spent the majority of his time in Panama studying under Fox 
Conner in preparation for European tank warfare. His time in the Philippines was more about 
handling MacArthur than about handling Filipino dissent. In addition, the Philippines can be 
considered an outlier amongst Asian former colonies, as the Philippines relationship with the 
United States was much better than most other colony/colonist relationships. When Eisenhower 
was in areas that would be considered the Third World, like North Africa, his main concern was 
not local indigenous support but local colonial support, that of Vichy France in the case of North 
Africa.69 
Eisenhower, and the generation of politicians and bureaucrats that served him, was 
trained around a Eurocentric model of the world. Europe dominated the world, with major 
conflicts emanating from its shores. Almost all of Africa and Asia belong to some European 
power. This mindset served them incredibly well during the European campaign of World War II 
and in the post-war development of Western Europe. But it slowly became a liability as the Cold 
War expanded into the newly independent Third World. Slowly, Eisenhower and his staff lost 
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some of their credentials as international savants. Dulles was labelled a victim of “pactomania” 
for his insistence on creating defensive pacts around the world, regardless of the value of the 
pacts.70 He insisted that SEATO was “an essential part of […] the deterrent power” against 
China, despite being essentially an American puppet.71 This disconnect between the hype and the 
realities of the alliance would prove too great to sustain. The world they were working with had 
evolved thanks to the de-colonization underway. They, regrettably, could not do likewise. 
Many of the nations at the conference would become important members of the Non-
Alignment Movement. This was by no means the desired effect of the SEATO initiative. The 
Americans struggled to recognize the importance of de-colonialization to these nations. They 
continually tried to impose a Cold War perspective on all actions taken in the Third World. They 
leaned upon their Filipino allies to insert anti-communist rhetoric into the final documents of the 
conference. Intrusions of this type made the United States few friends in the Third World. 
Similar mistakes would be made in the Suez Crisis two year later, when Eisenhower would 
denounce “Red colonialism” instead of colonialism.72 Eisenhower and his administration 
grasped the idea behind what the Third World wanted, but could only extricate it from the Cold 
War with great difficulty. Only rarely would America feel safe enough from potential 
Communist subversion to discard the rhetoric of the Cold War and address local concerns 
directly. 
SEATO did have its benefits. The alliance may have deterred another unilateral invasion 
from China, a la Korea. Fears of China had fueled much of the fears around Asia in the Cold 
War. The alliance did provide defensive assurances to several important countries, especially 
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Thailand, which was concerning about the spillover effects of the Communist insurgency in 
former Indochina. It served as a vehicle for American economic aid to the member nations, 
which bought goodwill and provided some economic growth amongst the Third World members. 
Thailand in particular came to rely on American support, being the most vulnerable member in 
the alliance due to its proximity to Vietnam. This resulted in special treaty agreements and 
protections for Thailand even after SEATO was dissolved.73  
 Yet SEATO failed to prevent the expansion of Communist control into Southeast Asia. 
Vietnam and the other former subjects of French Indochina all ultimately fell to Communist 
militants who instituted violent and repressive regimes. Hundreds of thousands of Americans 
went to war without support from its major allies.74 SEATO was never directly deployed in the 
battle for South Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia. During the Nixon Presidency, China was opened 
up and began to overtly drift away from the Soviet Union  By the middle of the 1970’s, SEATO 
had become anachronistic, the reality on the ground in Southeast Asia having rendered it moot. 
Criticism developed at home and abroad of the alliance.75 
SEATO was disbanded in 1977, with little more than a few cultural events and economic 
ties to its name. The American cause in Southeast Asia had been lost by then, and many 
Americans sought to sever their ties to the region to avoid any future conflicts. SEATO’s death 
illustrates the limits of the Eisenhower administration vision. Eisenhower, influenced by his 
experiences in World War Two and his work developing NATO, applied those lessons to the 
Cold War arena of Southeast Asia. This fateful miscalculation plagued the efforts of the 
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Eisenhower administration to win the Cold War battle for hearts and minds in the Third World. 
Unable to recognize the serious differences between Communist threats in Europe and 
Nationalist needs in Asia, the administration alienated potential allies and misapplied the NATO 
alliance model on Southeast Asia. Subsequent administration would struggle to craft a substitute 
policy for the failed experiment of SEATO. 
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